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Note
IS MANDATORY HIV TESTING
OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
REALLY THE SOLUTION?
AS THE PATHS OF LAW AND MEDICINE so often inter-
twine, so too do the paths of sports and medicine. Since ad-
eptness in sports requires "vigorous bodily exertion,"' an un-
commonly high degree of physical fitness and an exposure to
physical risks not incurred by most, routine medical practices
become fundamental to sports. In fact, athletes grow accus-
tomed to physical examinations and medical procedures as a
necessary part of the sporting life. However, in the latter part
of 1991, when the results of one such medical examination of a
well-known professional athlete were announced, shockwaves
were sent through the world of sports, causing such discourse
and debate that the paths of sports and medicine came to inter-
sect with a third path - that of the law.
The issue was the mandatory Human Immunodeficiency
Virus ("HIV") testing of athletes by their teams and leagues.
The announcement was that of the now-retired National Bas-
ketball Association ("NBA") superstar, Earvin "Magic" John-
son.2 For the first time, a professional athlete known and re-
1. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1377 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
2. On November 7, 1991, Earvin "Magic" Johnson, captain of the NBA's Los Ange-
les Lakers, announced his retirement from professional basketball after testing positive for
the HIV virus. Magic's announcement was forthright; he admitted that he contracted the
virus through unprotected heterosexual sex during a life filled with promiscuity and sexual
indulgences. See Thomas Heath & Christine Spolar, Magic Johnson's World: A Life of
Temptations; Star Resisted Few Until Stricken by HIV, WASH POST, Nov. 24, 1991, at
Al; Jack McCallum, Two Weeks After Magic Johnson's Revelation, The Sports World
Struggles Over What to Do Next, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 25, 1991, at 29.
Although retired from seasonal play, Magic Johnson gave a Most-Valuable-Player
performance at the NBA's All-Star Game in February 1992. Ian Thomsen, What, David
Stern Worry? But Someday Theyl Lose, INT'L HERALD TRIB, Apr. 17, 1992, at 17. In
May 1992. the Secretary-General of the International Basketball Federation ("F.I.B.A.")
stated that there was no reason why Magic Johnson, although HIV-positive, could not play
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vered throughout the world had contracted the deadly HIV
virus through unsafe heterosexual activity.3 The fears which
were brought to the forefront of the minds of the members of
the sports community with this single, yet devastating, an-
nouncement of HIV infection in their community were multi-
plied less than one month later. On December 3, 1991, two Ca-
nadian physicians in Montreal, Quebec, announced that a
young woman who had died of AIDS two years prior, had dis-
closed to them that she had had sexual intercourse with be-
tween thirty and seventy different players of the National
Hockey League ("NHL").4 With the possibility that ten per-
in the 1992 Summer Olympics. See Digest, OTTAWA CITIZEN, May 7, 1992, at F5. Not
only did Magic Johnson compete on the U.S. Olympic basketball squad, but he also led the
"Dream Team" to a gold medal. See Matt Spetalnick, Johnson Announces Return to Pro-
fessional Basketball, REUTERS. LIMITED, Sept. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Wires file.
After fighting the international controversy involved in his Olympic competition, John-
son came out of retirement. On September 29, 1992, he announced that he would resume
his playing career by playing between fifty and sixty of the L.A. Lakers' eighty-two regular
season games. Id. In October 1992, Magic even received a $14.6 million one-year contract
extension with the L.A. Lakers. See Clifton Brown, A Precious Gesture to Magic From
Boss, NY TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at B9, col. 6. Johnson admitted he was taking a risk with
his own health by returning to play, but explained that precautions would be taken to try to
limit his risk (i.e., eating well, following a health regime, avoiding back-to-back games,
putting on weight and muscle mass and taking AZT). His physician "described him as 'an
experiment called Earvin Johnson' and said AIDS experts were uncertain exactly how a
return to NBA play would affect his health. 'He is a unique case ...... Spetalnick,
supra.
Although it appeared that Magic Johnson's forthrightness and candor with the press
in dealing with his HIV infection, and its effect upon his professional basketball career,
was beneficial to the education of the public and other athletes in his league, many NBA
athletes were concerned about playing against Johnson upon his return. See Woman Suing
'Magic' Johnson for Allegedly Giving Her HIV, UPI 1992, Nov. 6, 1992 available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires file. After seeing fear on the faces of fellow players when he
cut himself during a pre-season game, Magic Johnson announced on November 2, 1992,
that he had decided to retire from professional basketball permanently. Id.
3. It is suggested that, as far as the general public is concerned, many people would
consider Magic Johnson the first famed professional athlete to be infected with the HIV
virus, at least through heterosexual activity. Actually, his was just the first professional
athlete case to be openly and personally announced in the media. Prior to this, though, at
least five professional athletes have died of AIDS-related infections.
They were: NFL player Jerry Smith, major league baseball player Alan Wiggins,
boxer Esteban DeJesus, stock car driver Tim Richmond and figure skater Robert McCall.
See Kevin Sherrington & Mitch Lawrence, Sex and Sports: Man) Athletes Say Barrage
of Sex Offers Blurs Their Judgment, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 18, 1991, at C5. Further-
more, we have no idea, nor any means for determining at present, how many other profes-
sional athletes are HIV-positive.
4. Dr. Clement Olivier and his associate, Dr. Rejean Thomas, declined to identify
the NHL players she had named. See Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Warning on AIDS Sur-
prises N.H.L., NY. TIMES, Dec. 4,1991, at B19, col. 6; John F. Burns, Canada Reckons
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cent of all NHL players were exposed to the HIV virus by one
woman, fears escalated. Concern grew that this deadly epi-
demic was reaching into the sports arena, so often considered a
fantasy world.
The subject of mandatory HIV testing of athletes was not
brought forth by the general public in an effort to protect the
general populace from transmission from a specific "high risk"
population.5 Nor was the proposal an effort to exclude HIV-
positive athletes from the spotlight of celebrity. In fact, the
general public has hardly been involved in the debate at all.
Rather, it has been a debate largely internal to the sports in-
dustry itself. Not only the coaches6 and owners7 of certain pro-
fessional sports teams, but also a number of well-respected pro-
fessional athletes themselves, have called for the institution of
mandatory testing policies for all athletes within their respec-
tive leagues." The reason is fear - fear that players 9 are at
with AIDS, NY TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at B24, col. 6. It should be noted that 50 NHL
players constitute approximately 10% of the combined rosters of the 22 NHL teams in
existence in 1991. Thomas, supra.
5. Many who argue that mandatory HIV testing is necessary to help slow the spread
of AIDS are willing to narrow their proposal to certain groups of persons to be tested.
"Some of the problems with universal mandatory testing would lessen if the required test-
ing were limited to members of 'high risk groups': groups with a high incidence of infection
such as gay men, IV drug users, hemophiliacs and their sexual partners." Martha A. Field,
Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 34, 61 (1990).
"High risk groups" have been defined as "subpopulations initially classified as having
greater numbers of HIV-infected persons. When these were proposed, the concomitant
message was that sexual and needle-sharing activities with members of these groups car-
ried a risk of getting AIDS . . . . The modern trend is to abandon labeling groups and to
focus on individual conduct such as unprotected sex or unsterile needle-sharing with an
HIV-positive partner." MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL. AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS xi
(Supp. 1992).
6. See Appendix B. Although none of the nine East Coast Hockey League head
coaches responding have implemented any sort of HIV testing policy (neither mandatory
nor voluntary) for players, 66.67% believe that mandatory HIV testing is necessary in
professional hockey; 22.22% believe that mandatory testing is not necessary in professional
hockey, while 11.11 % "don't know." Furthermore, 44.44% of the coaches responding feel
that a professional hockey player who is HIV-positive could not continue to play in the
ECHL without jeopardizing the health and safety of other players and staff. Only 22.22%
of the coaches responding feel that HIV-positive players playing would not be a threat,
while 33.33% do not know if such players would pose a danger.
7. For example, Norman Green, owner of the NHL's Minnesota North Stars (now
the Dallas Stars), considered requiring HIV tests before agreeing to any major salary in-
crease for his players. See Rosie Dimanno, Hockey Wives Tackle AIDS: 'Suddenly, yes, I
am scared,' TORONTO STAR, Dec. 14, 1991, at BI.
8. Arthur Ashe, professional tennis player, spent much time advocating the use of
mandatory HIV testing in professional sports, before his death from AIDS in early 1993.
See Larry Tye, Ashe Foresees AIDS Test Becoming Mandatory, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1,
1994]
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risk of contracting the virus every day at work, from blood-to-
blood contact during the not uncommon injuries and fights on
the playing field. 10 This fear may or may not be legitimate, but
so long as it exists there will be debate.
1992, at 61. Hockey superstar Wayne Gretzky also has called for mandatory HIV testing
in the NHL. See Larry Still, Gretzky Wants Mandatory AIDS Testing for NHL Players,
VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 5, 1991, at Fl; Gretzky Urges Mandatory AIDS Test for Hockey
Players, REUTERS, Dec. 4, 1991. Similarly, Todd Gill, the Toronto Maple Leafs' represen-
tative to the National Hockey League Players' Association, supports mandatory testing.
But see Gretzky's Support for Mandatory AIDS Tests in NHL is Dead Wrong, MON-
TREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 8, 1991, at B3 (disagreeing with Gretzky's endorsement of
mandatory testing). Damien Cox, AIDS Scare Rocks NHL Players, Owners Agree Disease
Must Be Faced Head-On, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 4, 1991, at Fl. In the NBA, Phoenix
Suns' guard, Kevin Johnson, is one of a number who support mandatory HIV testing in
their league. See Mandatory Testing for AIDS Sparks Different Views, USA TODAY, Nov.
I1, 1991, at 3C.
It also should be noted that those East Coast Hockey League coaches responding to
the "Mandatory HIV Testing and Professional Hockey Questionnaire" also estimated their
players' opinions on mandatory testing in the athletic workplace. The results vary greatly:
33.33% of the coaches responding believe more of their players are for testing than
against; 33.32% believe more of their players are against than for testing; 22.22% esti-
mate that almost all are against mandatory testing; and 11.11% estimate that almost all of
the team's players are in favor of mandatory testing. Interestingly, not one coach replied
that he did not know or that the groups were approximately equal. See Appendix B.
9. It should be noted that the term "players" in this context describes not only
athletes as individual persons, but also athletes as a sort of "property" of their respective
team. See infra Part I.A.
One commentator even stated his assumption that "management's motivation (for
mandatory testing] is to protect their monetary investment, ensuring that they aren't left
holding the bag the next time a player is diagnosed HIV positive." Len Elmore, HIV test-
ing for Athletes: Mandatory Testing By Teams Begs Questions About Motives, USA To-
DAY, Nov. 12, 1991, at 10C. Similarly, one news article stated:
There are . . . some obvious economic reasons our professional leagues should
concern themselves with the issue. It's bad business to ignore it. "The more prag-
matic and less humanitarian reason is that the clubs have a huge investment in
players, and this is a disease than [sic] can not only destroy a player's ability but
also can kill him . . . They're signing players to three-, four-, five-year guaranteed
contracts, and the disease literally can kill them."
Michael Knisley & Steve Meyerhoff, AIDS & Sports, SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 9, 1992, at
15 (quoting Major League Baseball Deputy Commissioner Steve Greenburg).
10. Certain team contact sports often are labelled as "bloody" due to the high inci-
dence of injuries and fights in which blood is drawn. Of the four major league team sports
(football, baseball, basketball and ice hockey), hockey and football are often described as
such bloody sports. See Pat Carroll, Athletes Are Playing Dangerous Games with AIDS,
SPORTING NEWS, Sept. 7, 1992, at 7 (stating, "(fbootball is not only the most violent team
sport with a high incidence of bloody injuries, it is also potentially the most risky in terms
of blood exposure because players block and tackle with skin-to-skin contact"); Kevin Paul
DuPont, AIDS Scare May Be Way to Check the Overuse of Fists in NHL, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Dec. 8, 1991, at 10 (calling hockey "a game often marked by bloody one-on-
one fights and occasional brawls, [which] could be leaving players at risk of contracting the
virus. . . . Once discarding their gloves to fight, players often tear the skin off their knuck-
les . . . while flailing away with punches to their opponent's head. To see a fight end with
both combatants bloodied is hardly uncommon.").
[Vol. 4:159
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Although to date, none of North America's four major
professional sports leagues has adopted a mandatory HIV test-
ing policy,1' some leagues' players' associations have introduced
the testing issue into collective bargaining discussions. 2 Fur-
thermore, a number of individual teams have initiated
mandatory testing policies. 3 Opponents of mandatory HIV
testing in athletics have labelled such policies "a hysterical re-
While acknowledging that the chance of HIV transmission in sports "is remote,"
the United States Olympic Committee has ranked categories in order of risk. At
greatest risk are the bloodiest: boxing, tae kwon do and wrestling. Moderate risk
sports . . . are basketball, field hockey, ice hockey, judo, soccer and team hand-
ball. Physicians should inform HIV-positive athletes involved in "a sport involving
blood exposure, such as wrestling or football . . . of the theoretical risk of conta-
gion to others and strongly encourage him to consider another sport," concludes
the American Academy of Pediatrics.
Carol Krucoff, AIDS Time-Out: Assessing the Risk of HIV Transmission in Sports,
WASH POST, March 10, 1992, at Z20.
11. See AIDS Test Guidelines Missing at Pro Level, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 8, 1991,
at C7.
12. For example, on November I1, 1991, both the Major League Baseball Players'
Association and the NBA Players' Association announced plans to discuss the possibility of
testing athletes for the HIV virus. See, e.g., Tim Panaccio, Pros Talk About Testing, CAL-
GARY HERALD, Nov. 12, 1991, at E5.
13. The National Football League ("NFL") has consistently stood against league-
wide HIV testing, preferring to let its individual teams handle the issue. Mark Asher,
Tagliabue Says Testing Should Be Up To Teams, WASH POST, Nov. 9, 1991, at D6.
This is not a new issue for some teams in the NFL. In 1987, the Dallas Cowboys were
the first NFL team to allow for voluntary AIDS testing of athletes who requested it. Id. In
1991, Dallas expanded its testing policy to allow for HIV testing to be available to every-
one on a voluntary basis (not just upon individual request) at the 1992 training camp. See
id.; Cowboys May Make AIDS Testing Available, UPI, Nov. 12, 1991, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
Since 1988, at least nine other NFL teams have set up some variation of an HIV
testing policy. The list includes the Giants, Eagles, Browns, Redskins, Vikings, Oilers,
Cardinals, Raiders and Rams. See Asher, supra; Giants Fourth Team to Undergo Testing
for the AIDS Virus, TORONTO STAR, May 21, 1992, at BIO [hereinafter Giants]. The
Philadelphia Eagles and New York Giants have both arguably put into effect policies for
HIV testing which are mandatory. See Giants, supra. In 1991, the Eagles tested every
player and some front office personnel for the virus at the start of their training camp,
which could be in violation of a Pennsylvania statute. See id.
The NFL Players' Association protested that some Eagles' players were unaware that
they had been tested for the virus. See id.; Frank Dell'Apa, Patriots Mull AIDS Testing,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1991, at 29; Steve Springer, Testing Not Mandatory in Pros,
NCAA, LA TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1991, at C7. Similarly, the New York Giants expanded their
medical exams to include HIV testing, as of the end of May 1992. See Giants, supra, at
BI0. Although the NFL stressed in a letter to clubs, dated December 1991, that testing
must be voluntary, several Giants' players were unaware they were being tested for the
virus. George Willis, Giants Test for HIV, NEWSDAY, May 20, 1992, at 145.
("[A]pparently if a player didn't question the blood work, he was not told [of the HIV
tests].") One writer went so far as to generalize that, "[a]lthough the players were not
informed they were being tested for HIV, none seemed to mind." Michael Eisen, New
York Giants, SPORTING NEWS, June 8, 1992, at 37. But see supra note 6 (noting that not
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action," '14 very "simplistic,"' 5 and "a kneejerk response."' 6 Fur-
thermore, they question the effectiveness and legality of such
policies.
This note will examine the issues surrounding HIV and
professional sports in an attempt to answer the question
whether a professional sports league or team legally may man-
date its players to submit to HIV testing. A parallel question
that will be examined is whether a league or team ethically
should require such HIV testing. In doing so, this note will an-
alyze the legitimacy of the professional athletes' concerns -
both their concern regarding transmission risks and their con-
cern regarding the loss of individual rights should testing be
mandated.
Part I of this note will focus on the world of the profes-
sional athlete. Part II will provide a medical background of Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") and the trans-
mission of HIV. Part III will discuss the means of testing for
HIV antibodies; it also will describe the premise behind the
mandatory HIV testing proposals. Finally, Part III will explain
the analytical approach which is taken in the final sections of
this note to determine whether a professional sports team or
league may legally, and should ethically, impose a mandatory
HIV testing policy upon its players. Part IV is devoted to de-
termining whether such a policy has an ethically acceptable
purpose. Part V will discuss whether mandatory testing is nec-
essary and effective for achieving that purpose. Part VI will
cover the legalities involved, including the common law privacy
issue, the state statutory issues of consent and confidentiality
and the issue of freedom from discrimination in light of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Part VII will draw
conclusions as to why mandatory testing for HIV antibodies in
professional athletes violates the individual rights of the athlete
and why it is, at best, unethical.
one of the East Coast Hockey League teams whose coaches responded to the survey has
developed any sort of mandatory HIV testing policy as of yet).
14. Paul Radford, No AIDS Tests at Olympics, 'Magic' Johnson Will Be Welcome,
REUTERS, Feb. 3, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires file (quoting the head of
the International Olympic Committee).
15. Charles Grantham, HIV Testing for Athletes: Equitable Program for Players at
Top of Agenda, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1991, at 10C.
16. See Flawed Thinking on AIDS in Sport, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 8, 1991, at B2;
Elmore, supra note 9, at 10C.
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I. THE WORLD OF THE PROFESSIONAL
ATHLETE1
The first question that must be answered in a note discuss-
ing mandatory HIV testing of professional athletes is "why
professional athletes?" What is so special about this class of
individuals that warrants discussion about a mandatory screen-
ing of the group? To answer this question, one needs only to
look to the literature of sports law:
Professional sports have grown to be an integral part of the
history, folklore, and habits of the American people. The
"star" athletes are publicized, glamorized, and eulogized. In
spite of the fact that the professional athlete earns his liveli-
hood by participating in sports, the public tends to disassoci-
ate him from the economic and business aspects of the sports
industry. The world of sports is looked upon in a romantic
manner as a world of entertainment, separate and unique in
itself.... However, the economic aspects of sports as a com-
mercial unit in the entertainment industry seem to be stu-
diously neglected by the sports commentators. In the process
of building images of "folk heroes," the sportswriters have
failed to give proper coverage to the professional athlete's
status and working conditions as an "employee." 18
The preceding statement illustrates the three areas of the
world of the professional athlete which distinguish him from
the general public. As will be seen, each of these areas demon-
strates why the issue of the legality and ethics of mandatory
HIV testing of this class of persons is worthy of examination.
The three areas to be discussed are: the "economic and busi-
17. This note will be limited in scope to the issues involving the mandatory HIV
testing of the professional athlete. This may be defined as a non-amateur athlete who
receives some form of monetary compensation (whether or not such compensation is wholly
or in part deferred) for athletic performance. Particularly, this note will look at the profes-
sional athletes of the National Football League, Major League Baseball, NBA, and NHL,
as well as their minor league affiliates. Part I will discuss the reasons for looking at the
issues involved in mandating HIV testing of professional athletes. Although some of the
discussion also may be pertinent to amateur athletes, such as those in the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association, the business and property aspects of professional sports add
many different facets to the mandatory testing issue not found with amateur athletics.
Further, it may be noted that this note is limited to the examination of HIV testing in
team sports. The reason for this being the clearer concept of transmission of the virus
(potentially) through the contact of more than one athlete on the playing field simultane-
ously. Although such sports as boxing and wrestling fit this criterion, I am limiting discus-
sion of policies involved in these one-on-one sports, when pertinent, to the footnotes.
18. Erwin G. Krasnow & Herman M. Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports,
51 GEo LJ 749, 749 (1963).
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ness aspects," the "professional athlete's status and working
conditions as an 'employee'," and the fact that "athletes are
publicized, glamorized, and eulogized."' 19
A. Economic and Business Aspects
Although often romanticized, professional sports owner-
ship and management is a business like any other. As such, the
profitmaking objective, simply put, calls for assets to outweigh
liabilities. The difference here between professional sports and
most businesses is the nature of the assets. In professional
sports, the athlete is an asset of the team20 arguably giving the
team certain property rights in that player and his health.2'
Some may argue, rather, that a contract between a team and
an athlete is not a sales contract but rather a personal service
employment contract as is common in many businesses. How-
ever, the differences in terms of a professional athlete's con-
tract illustrate that there is some justification for the property
argument:
The ordinary man expects that with success in his field, he
can realize an increasing measure of personal freedom. The
satisfaction of such a hope is, in fact, largely denied to the
professional athlete . . . . The professional athlete is treated
as the legal chattel of his club ownership. He can be sold or
traded at will. He is thus denied both employment security
and the ordinary opportunity to create a stable and relatively
secure home life for himself and his family .... 22
Numerous commentators similarly have argued that sys-
tems, which, to some extent, bind a player to one team which
holds the right to assign the player's contract to any other
19. Id.
20. It is important to note the different ways in which the term "team" may be
interpreted. The team may be seen as an owner of the "property" known as the athletes, as
the employer of these athletes, or as a group of athletes in and of themselves.
In the context at hand, as well as at various times in the text of this note, the term
"team" will be used to describe the ownership of the athletic property. This may involve an
individual owner of the team; or, it may involve the team as a legal entity, such as a
corporation, partnership or limited partnership. In any case, the "team's" property rights
would, generally speaking, be represented by and looked after by the team's hired manage-
ment, particularly a general manager or coaching staff.
21. See infra part I.B.
22. Michael Schneiderman, Professional Sport: Involuntary Servitude and The Pop-
ular Will, 7 GONZ L REv 63, 67-69 (1971).
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team, 3 are "promoting involuntary servitude"24 and treating
professional athletes basically like "peons" 5 or "slaves. '"26
Such statements may be overly harsh and one-sided, though it
should be remembered that the athlete consensually entered
into an agreement, quite possibly in exchange for a very large
salary. This raises an issue which will be discussed in Part VI.
To what extent are we, as a society, willing to allow profes-
sional athletes to bargain away their individual rights and
freedoms?
The standard player contract is another business aspect of
sport which is worthy of comment. 27 Interestingly, one well-
known sports law treatise limits the purpose of most contracts
to obtaining the player's consent to abide by any rules which
the team or league may create.' In fact, most of the major
professional sports teams typically include a clause in their
standard player contract which specifically incorporates the
league and team rules and by-laws as a part of the contract.29
23. See, e.g., J WEISTART & C LOWELL. THE LAW OF SPORTS 292 (1979) [herein-
after WEISTART]. Most standard player contracts include a provision noting that the sign-
ing player has agreed that the team will "have the right to assign the contract to any other
team. Many of these contracts further provide that the player promises to fully perform for
any assignee team. Id. Although the usual rule is that rights under personal service con-
tracts cannot be assigned, unless prior consent of the employee is secured, these major
sports standard player contracts are considered the vehicle for securing the requisite prior
consent. Id. at 300.
24. Note, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 MAINE L. REV. 459, 469
(1970).
25. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 777 (quoting American League Club v. Chase, 149
N.Y.S. 6, 19 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
26. Id. at 777 (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949)
(Frank, J., dissenting)).
27. See id. at 664-65, stating:
In most leagues, a club's right to control a player's conduct arises from the con-
tract which is entered into with the employee. But that contract is not wholly the
product of individual negotiation between the two parties. In most cases, the basic
outline of the agreement is prescribed by the league and embodied in a uniform
player's contract which all clubs must use. One of the uniform terms is that which
exacts the player's agreement to abide by the rules which the club imposes ....
The image of the league as sponsoring competition between teams of athletes who
are serious, dedicated, and well-trained will be promoted if each club accepts re-
sponsibility for controlling its own employees. Thus, the common agreement on the
need for discipline by individual employers can be seen as a part of the larger
design to insure the success of the joint venture.
Furthermore, "[since] It]he parties typically use a standard form contract . . .it is
normally assumed that except for matters of compensation and length of contract, there is
little room for negotiation." Id. at 200.
28. Id. at 259.
29. Id. at 207.
19941
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This traditionally has led to much discretion on the part of
league and team management over controlling and monitoring
aspects of the player's life which directly relate to his ability to
perform. For example, rules regarding practices, curfews and
medical examinations30 are found in every team in every
league.
The National Labor Relations Act provides professional
athletes with the right to collectively bargain about employ-
ment terms and conditions through representatives that they
have chosen. 3' A treatise in sports law noted:
While the disciplinary process in the sports industry has his-
torically been presented to the players on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, that is changing in some important respects. The ad-
vent of players' unions increases the likelihood of player-in-
put into the disciplinary process. The players' interests in this
regard receive substantial support from the [National Labor
Relations Act] . . . which requires that the employer-clubs
must bargain about all matters affecting "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. '3 2
The collective bargaining unit is generally the league, with
player representatives from each team.3 These representatives
may discuss any matter relating to the terms and conditions of
the players' employment,3 4 including issues such as mandatory
testing.
The question arises as to individual opinions of athletes
which differ from the collective opinion.
Once a bargaining representative is recognized, however, it
becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees
within the unit, whether or not they are members of the
union or agree with the terms and conditions that are negoti-
ated in their behalf. Individual employees may bargain on
30. See discussion infra part I.B.
31. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988); see also WEISTART
supra note 23, at 788.
32. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 263 (citing National Labor Relations Act § 8(d).
29 U.S.C. § 158(D) (1974)).
33. Id. at 792.
34. The exception is that illegal subjects may not be included in a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Id. at 819 ("Illegal subjects may not be included in a collective bargaining
agreement and the insistence of either side that they be included will constitute a failure to
bargain in good faith. Such subjects include those which would be unlawful or inconsistent
with the basic policies of the NLRA."); see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner,
356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958) (holding that employers cannot legally insist on acceptance of
provisions outside the scope of mandatory bargaining).
[Vol. 4:159
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their own only if so provided in the collective bargaining
agreement.3 5
Once the collective bargaining agreement is reached, so long as
all parties have bargained in good faith, it will be binding upon
all players in the league who have signed the standard player
contract.36 Whether or not an individual player agrees with ne-
gotiated terms is irrelevant, so long as the player representative
"fairly represented" all members of the bargaining
unit-minority as well as majority opinions.37 The U.S. Su-
preme Court stated in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to
which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individ-
ual employees and classes of' employees. 38 The com-
plete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly . . .
expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a
• . . bargaining representative in serving the unit it repre-
sents . . . . 9
There is little room for individual negotiation as to terms and
conditions of professional sports employment, at least so far as
the non-"star" quality player is concerned. Therefore, many
skilled athletes who disagree with certain league policies are
forced into compliance in exchange for the opportunity to play
their sport and fulfill their long-time dreams.4 °
Finally, in this discussion of the "business" of sport, one
should note the special issues that arise regarding the termina-
tion of a professional athlete's contract. First, the individual
player cannot end the contractual relationship easily; "the
player has relatively few grounds upon which he can terminate,
and if the player is a star performer, the team will attempt to
do everything it can to avoid providing a basis for termina-
tion.""' On the other hand, the team management has very
35. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 806-07.
36. Id. at 803.
37. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RR, 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) (holding that a
labor organization must represent all members, minority as well as majority, and cannot
act with "hostile discrimination" amongst its members). See also WEISTART supra note 23,
at 807.
38. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
39. Id. at 338.
40. It should be remembered that many professional athletes have been groomed to
play their particular sport from a very tender age, sometimes as early as two years of age.
Years of hard work are spent developing skills and abilities necessary to be a winner, some-
times neglecting education and occupational skills.
41. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 279.
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broad discretion to terminate a player's contract, oftentimes
ending his career.42 Therefore, the non-"star" quality player is
left with relatively little job security.43
B. Status and Working Conditions as an "Employee"
As was discussed in the preceding section, a professional
athlete is bound by the numerous rules, policies and procedures
of the league and the team by which he is employed, by the
terms of his contract and by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.44 This section briefly will examine how the physical na-
ture of sport raises special issues in terms of working conditions
and terms to be met to retain the athlete's employment status.
In contracts for personal services, the employee's continu-
ing physical ability to perform the service generally is consid-
ered a condition precedent to the employer's duty of remunera-
tion.45 In the world of the professional athlete, by signing the
standard player contract:
[T]he player typically represents that he is free from
debilitating injuries. In addition, he makes a general war-
ranty that he is in good physical condition, which presumably
means that his general overall state of physical well being is
such that he can endure the rigors of professional sports
training and competition. 46
For this reason, teams require thorough pre-season physical ex-
aminations. Furthermore, teams employ physicians and trainers
to provide medical treatment and physical training in an effort
to maintain the health and fitness of each player. Generally, a
42. Id. at 230 (stating "clubs retain vast powers to terminate the contracts, and usu-
ally the careers, of the athletes they employ ...[as] the coach must retain broad preroga-
tives to make personnel changes in his search for the magic combination of talent, attitude,
and leadership which will produce a winning team"). Although teams, and oftentimes
coaches and general managers of teams, retain broad discretion to terminate a player's
contract, any termination must have some grounds based in the written contract. Id. at
230-31.
There are four grounds for termination which are often recognized in standard player
contracts. The team may terminate if the athlete: (I) is not physically fit; (2) fails to
exhibit sufficient skill and ability to play the particular sport; (3) fails to observe team and
league rules or (4) otherwise materially breaches the contract. Id. at 236-37. Furthermore,
some of the standard player contracts recognize a fifth ground, for the athlete's failure to
exhibit good moral character. Id. at 237.
43. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 197.
44. See discussion supra part I.A.
45. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 216.
46. Id. at 216-17.
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team's standard player contract defines the consequences of a
failure to maintain one's physical fitness to play or of a failure
to pass the pre-season medical exam to include suspension or
termination of the player's contract.4"
Generally, the standard player contracts for most leagues
are very explicit in providing for the question of who bears the
risk of injuries. As physical injuries often are considered by
players and management alike to be a cost of the game, the
team generally accepts liability for injuries sustained by the
player while performing the terms of the contract.48 These ex-
penses are generally limited by the contract to those incurred
within the time frame of the contract and not otherwise cov-
ered by medical insurance.4 9 As soon as the player is once
again physically fit to return to play, he is obligated to play
under his contract; this determination often is based upon the
sole discretion of the team physician. 0 Interestingly, a conflict
may be involved here when the team physician makes this de-
termination. "If he is found not to be [fit to play], then he will
continue to be a drain on the club's payroll without contribut-
ing to its revenue-producing ventures on the field."'" Should
the player be declared fit to play and then found to no longer
exhibit the minimum level of skill required to play on that
team, the team has a ground for termination of his contract. 2
The risk of physical injury in such sports as basketball,
baseball, football and ice hockey is great. Economically speak-
ing, from the perspective of the professional athlete, "the con-
sequences of an injury can be quite severe, as the athlete's
earning potential is reduced from that of highly paid player to
that of a poorly trained, unspecialized male, who in many cases
does not even have a college degree despite four years attend-
47. Id. at 217.
48. Id. at 217.
49. Id. at 222.
50. Id. at 240-41. It should be noted that, generally, the team physician is given
great discretion, if not sole discretion, to determine whether the athlete is physically fit to
play. "The athlete may well be concerned that a . . . physician's loyalty to the team will
influence his decision." WEISTART, supra note 23, at 241. See also Charles V. Russell,
Legal and Ethical Conflicts Arising from the Team Physician's Dual Obligations to the
Athlete and Management, 10 SETON HALL LEGIS J. 299 (1987); Joseph H. King, Jr., The
Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 Hous L REv 657 (1981).
51. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 227.
52. Id. at 228.
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ance at such an institution. ' 3 Although this commentary
might be unfairly harsh, it illustrates the extreme consequences
which are sometimes involved in the world of the injured pro-
fessional athlete.
Obviously, the risk of injury to a player is a subject which
is clearly provided for, in advance, by the professional sports
team. It is, to some extent, considered a cost of business. Fur-
thermore, teams incur other costs in an attempt to prevent such
injuries; they do this by monitoring the fitness and health of
each player, as provided for in the terms of the contract and
collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, although
the athletes who incur the physical risks of injury can be pre-
sumed to realize that they are putting themselves at risk by
playing, they continue to play the sport. Oftentimes these ath-
letes are not prepared for any other career should their sports
career suddenly end. Quite possibly it is this very same reason
why most athletes continue to play, despite the risks of physical
injury to themselves. Other factors that come into play in the
world of professional sports are the incentives of wealth, fame,
a glamorous lifestyle and the achievement of a dream created
in childhood. These are factors which do not commonly play
into the analysis of why, in the realm of the general public,
employees endure working conditions which may be unsafe and
comply with policies with which they may disagree.
C. Publicity, Glamour and Eulogy
Finally, in this note's discussion of why the legality and
ethics of mandatory HIV testing policies of professional sports
teams and leagues need to be examined, one must look at the
factors of publicity and the sports lifestyle.
Generally speaking, professional athletes are often in the
public eye, in and out of the sports pages. A clear example of
the significance of this, within the context of the AIDS issue,
was the threat by the press to disclose to the public tennis star
Arthur Ashe's battle with AIDS.54 Through the years, many
53. Id. at 215-16.
54. Arthur Ashe, who has since died of an AIDS-related infection, grudgingly re-
ported his HIV infection in late 1991, as it was about to be announced by the press. A
former Wimbledon and U.S. Open tennis champion, Ashe became infected with the virus
when he had a blood transfusion during heart bypass surgery. See generally Tye, supra
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have argued that once a professional athlete signs a "big
league" contract, he gives up his right to privacy.55
It should be noted that the publicity of professional ath-
letes need not always be negative. For example, Earvin
"Magic" Johnson clearly and deliberately has used his celeb-
rity, and its companion publicity, to educate the general public
about HIV infection and AIDS. 56 Furthermore, the publicity
regarding the great debate within the four major professional
leagues as to whether to initiate a mandatory HIV testing pol-
icy for their players has raised much discourse on the subject.
Such discussion educates the general public regarding the ra-
tionales behind mandatory testing of any group and may in-
form people of their individual rights.
Finally, the glamour of the lifestyle of professional athletes
is an obvious reason to single them out. Before discussing any
potential risk of transmission of the HIV virus during the
games, one must recognize "the games after the
games. . . .-5 Although statistics are not readily available on
this point, it appears safe to say that professional athletes quite
often are given the opportunity to engage in promiscuous be-
havior. Potentially, these athletes actually could engage in an
equal amount of such unsafe"" behavior. As one writer opined:
Few athletes come out of high school or college prepared for
the lifestyle they encounter. . . . Some athletes are so intoxi-
cated with sudden wealth and celebrity, 'they invite the vari-
ous vices that are readily available.. . . Others, either unso-
phisticated or uneducated in dealing with new-found money
note 8, at 61; Ashe Says AIDS Sports Testing May Be Necessary, PRESS Assoc NEW-
SFILE, Dec. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires file.
55. A related issue will be discussed in Part VI of this Note.
56. See, e.g., SPETALNICK, supra note 2 (stating that President George Bush named
Johnson to the National Commission on AIDS, only days after Johnson first announced
that he would retire due to HIV infection).
57. See Knisley & Meyerhoff, supra note 9, at 15; Greg Boeck, Fears Slow Down
The Walk on the Wild Side, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 1992, at 12C; see also Julie Cart &
Randy Harvey, Sex Beckons Pro Athletes at Every Turn, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 10, 1991,
at G8.
As one commentator stated, "clearly the risk doesn't happen in the sports arena, but in
an athlete's personal life." Krucoff, supra note 10, at Z20. Experts are predicting an in-
crease in the number of athletes who will become HIV-positive because of sexual promiscu-
ity and intravenous drug use. Id. An example of the extent to which such promiscuity may
be carried is seen in the case of NBA superstar Wilt Chamberlain. The fifty-five year old
athlete, in his 1991 autobiography, disclosed that he had had sex with over 20,000 women
during his professional sports career. Cart & Harvey, supra, at G8.
58. See infra part II.
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and fame, are easy targets for groupies looking for a "tro-
phy" or women looking to become "subsidiaries." .59
On the other hand:
[t]hat is not to suggest that athletes are naturally more pro-
miscuous than the general public, but the combination of
their healthy bodies and paychecks, celebrity and availability
on those long, lonely nights on the road makes for a powerful
aphrodisiac for members of the opposite sex.60
Clearly, there exists an issue whether professional athletes' ce-
lebrity, and sexual conduct in response to that celebrity, might
make them a "high reservoir" of infection with the deadly
AIDS virus. This may raise causation issues regarding HIV
transmission in sports.
II. AIDS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV
In 1981, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
("MMWR") first reported a mysterious and deadly disease,
now known as AIDS.6 ' First recognized as a disease of young
homosexual males and intravenous drug users, AIDS soon
spread to pandemic proportions, no longer sparing heterosexual
males, females and children.62 The cause of AIDS has since
been linked to a human virus, 63 known as HIV. In overly sim-
plistic terms, the HIV virus attacks a human's immune system
by destroying one type of T-lymphocyte, known as T-helper, or
"T-4" cells. This prevents the multiplication of T-killer cells,
thereby weakening the immune system. Gradually, the immune
system is so weakened that it cannot fight off opportunistic in-
fections, 64 which eventually leads to the patient's death. Studies
have shown that most to all HIV-infected persons will develop
59. Boeck, supra note 57.
60. Cart & Harvey, supra note 57 at CI.
61. CLOSEN ET AL, supra note 5, at 47-48; see also id. at 51-52 (discussing why
AIDS was first reported in MMWR rather than a more prestigious, peer-reviewed journal).
62. Of the 242,146 cases of AIDS reported in the U.S. as of September 30, 1992, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta report that 15,221 of these persons
are believed to have contracted the virus through heterosexual sex, 136,912 through homo-
sexual sex and 54,475 through intravenous drug use. See Michael Arace, Magic: A Victim
of Baseless Fears, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 4, 1992, at Cl. It should be noted that
these figures only include those cases of AIDS which have been reported. Experts estimate
that, as of November 1992, one million persons in the U.S. were infected with HIV. Id.
63. See, e.g., JOHN LANGONE. AIDS THE FACTS 22-24 (1988) (describing how a
virus works by invading a cell and using it to rapidly reproduce copies of itself).
64. Those infections which generally do not cause disease in humans with properly
functioning immune systems are known as opportunistic infections.
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AIDS within seven to ten years from the time of infection.65
The drug azidothymidine, commonly known as AZT, has been
shown to slow the onset of the symptoms of AIDS-related com-
plex ("ARC") and AIDS in HIV-infected individuals, by
preventing retroviral replication.66
The HIV virus has been found in the following bodily
fluids of infected persons: blood, serum, semen, vaginal fluids,
breast milk, saliva and tears.67 The virus commonly is transmit-
ted through both homosexual and heterosexual intercourse,
blood transfusions and the sharing of intravenous needles. An
HIV-infected pregnant woman may transmit the virus to her
child in utero, during vaginal delivery or possibly even through
breast feeding. It is important to note that no cases of trans-
mission through tears or saliva have been reported, although
this is considered theoretically possible.
The issue of theoretical possibilities for HIV transmission
leads to often-asked questions regarding the scope of potential
transmission through blood-to-blood contact. Various groups,
including athletes and certain health care workers, are asking
what the risks are of blood-to-blood transmission through open
wounds. At this time, the best answer that experts can give is
that it is "theoretically possible", yet "extremely unlikely. '68
This is usually followed by comments regarding the lack of
awareness of any documented cases, as of yet. 9 A spokesman
for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta,
Georgia, was quoted as saying:
Theoretically, you could have blood-to-blood transmission via
contact of open wounds, but it's extremely unlikely. Ninety
percent of AIDS is transmitted by sex and injecting drug use.
That's where your real risk is. . . . We are not aware of any
65. Seven to ten years is a median figure. A. Alyce Werdel, Mandatory AIDS Test-
ing: The Legal, Ethical and Practical Issues, 5 NOTRE DAME J L_ ETHICS & PUB POL'Y
155, 160 (1990).
66. Id. at 187.
67. It should be noted that "women ... are themselves very poor transmitters of the
disease. Most studies show they are four to five times more likely to get AIDS from a male
partner than vice versa." Dimanno, supra note 7, at BI. "Although the virus is present in
both semen and cervical fluid, it is transmitted more efficiently from men to women than
from women to men. This is most likely due to the fact that men inoculate women with a
substantial dose of the virus during sexual intercourse, and women naturally retain the
bodily secretions." Werdel, supra note 65, at 161.
68. See, e.g., Arace, supra note 62, at Cl.
69. See id.
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documented transmission through any type of sports activity.
We have no data, but it would be extremely, extremely
doubtful it could happen.7"
A joint statement by the World Health Organization and the
International Federation of Sports Medicine appears to give
the possibility a certain amount of merit:
There is a possible very low risk of HIV transmission if an
infected athlete with a bleeding wound or a skin lesion comes
into direct contact with another athlete who has a skin lesion
or exposed mucous membrane that could possibly serve as a
portal of entry for the virus. 1
Such uncertainty, although unavoidable at this point, leads
to fear, which in turn leads to calls for extreme action such as
mandatory HIV antibody testing.
III. HIV ANTIBODY TESTING
A. Procedures, Proposals and Laws
The term "HIV testing," though widely used, often is la-
beled as inaccurate in describing the means for detecting the
deadly virus in individuals. While testing for the HIV virus it-
self is possible, the common practice is to detect the presence of
certain antibodies which are produced by the human immune
system in response to the HIV virus.
The most commonly used test is the Enzyme-Linked Im-
munosorbant Assay, commonly referred to as the ELISA test.
It is typically the first test given, due to its reasonably low ex-
pense and its fairly consistent results.72 If a positive result is
found, the test generally is repeated a second time.73 Generally,
typical protocol requires that two positive ELISA results be
confirmed by a more precise test called the Western Blot test.74
This confirmation test "identifies antibodies to proteins of a
specific molecular weight, and therefore helps to eliminate false
positives."75 Should the results of the Western Blot be unclear,
a third test, the Immunofluorescence Assay is available. It de-
70. Id.
71. Krucoff, supra note 10, at Z20.
72. Field, supra note 5, at 38.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 38 n.Il (quoting AIDS AND THE LAW A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 130
(Harlon L. Dalton et al., eds. 1987)).
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tects, through a dye process, whether cells are infected by the
virus.7 This testing protocol has been developed in an effort to
achieve the objectives of ensuring an affordable accurate test-
ing and preventing the potential discrimination and mental
anguish which may accompany a false positive result.
When discussing the accuracy of HIV antibody testing,
there are three factors to be considered. The first, alluded to
above, is the internal accuracy of the test itselF1 - the greater
the ability of a test to detect when HIV antibodies are present,
the less ability that same test has to detect the absence of HIV
infection when the individual is not infected. 8 Second, the
number of false positives and false negatives also will depend
upon the risk factors of the particular population tested. In
short, "false positive rates are much greater in low risk, or low
prevalence, populations."7 9 Finally, when determining the effec-
tiveness of any HIV antibody testing policy, one must consider
the timeline of the disease as well. In the infection process,
there is potential for variation in the length of the latency pe-
riod. Simply stated, there is a period of time, varying in length,
between actual infection and the immune system's production
of antibodies in response to infection. The period ranges from a
few months to eighteen months, and even longer periods have
been reported.8 However, a high percentage of those infected
will test positive within six weeks to three months after infec-
tion. This is important to note because, during this latency pe-
riod, an HIV-infected individual will test negative yet be able
to transmit HIV to another.81 Clearly, these are factors which
must be kept in mind when determining the effectiveness and
necessity of a mandatory testing policy of any specific
population.
Since the AIDS pandemic has spread throughout human-
kind, many have argued for extreme measures to prevent the
transmission of the deadly virus. Arguments are made as to
76. Id. at 38.
77. The possibility of human error on the part of the examiners is not considered
when discussing the internal accuracy of the test itself.
78. Field, supra note 5, at 39-40.
79. Id. at 40-41; see generally Klemens B. Meyer & Stephen G. Pauker, Screening
for HIV. Can We Afford the False Positive Rate?, 317 NEw ENG J MED 238, 239
(1987) (discussing false positive rates of HIV antibody testing in low-risk populations).
80. Field, supra note 5, at 41-42.
81. Id. at 41.
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why, or why not, universal mandatory testing is appropriate in
our society. Proponents often contend that mandatory testing of
every individual would prevent transmission, at least to some
extent, as well as provide the necessary specific data for epide-
miological study. Some have gone as far as to say that such
data could be used in an effort to quarantine HIV-infected per-
sons.8 2 Opponents of universal mandatory testing proposals
generally have countered with arguments regarding the ex-
tremely high cost, the unrealistic dimensions of such a project,
the lack of proven effectiveness and, most importantly, the vio-
lation of citizens' constitutional rights.83
State legislatures generally have agreed with the oppo-
nents of mandatory HIV testing. A number of states have en-
acted some variation of an AIDS prevention act;84 some twenty
states adopted statutes prohibiting involuntary HIV testing.85
Furthermore, the vast majority of states require some form of
consent for an individual to be tested for HIV antibodies.86
82. See, e.g., Wendy E., AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine,
14 HOFSTRA L. REV 53, 73 (1985); see also Dorothy R. Gregory, AIDS-The Leprosy of
the 1980's: Is There a Case for Quarantine?, 9 J LEGAL MED 547, 552-55 (1988) (paral-
leling Babylonian and biblical quarantine of lepers with modern-day suggestions for quar-
antine of AIDS patients). But see David P.T. Price, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Chart-
ing a Course to Reconcile the Duty of Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn in the AIDS
Context, 94 DICK L REV 435, 444-62 (1990).
83. See, e.g., Field, supra note 5; Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Case Against Com-
pulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS - Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 Am
J L & MED 7 (1986). But see Werdel, supra note 65.
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-IIA-54 (Supp. 1993); DEL CODE ANN tit. 16,
§ 1203 (Supp. 1992); GA CODE ANN § 24-9-47 (Michie Supp. 1993); KY REV STAT
ANN § 214.181 (Baldwin 1991); NC GEN STAT § 130A-143 (1992); OHIO REV CODE
ANN § 3701.243 (Anderson 1992); 35 PA CoNs STAT § 7607 (1993).
85. See ALA CODE § 22-1 IA-54 (Supp. 1993), ARIz REV STAT ANN § 36-63
(1993), ARK CODE ANN § 20-15-905 (Michie 1991), COLO REV STAT ANN § 25-4-
1405 (West 1993), CONN GEN STAT ANN § 190-582 (West Supp. 1992), GA CODE
ANN § 31-17A-2, (Michie Supp. 1993) HAW REV STAT ANN § 325-16 (1992), IND
CODE ANN § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (West 1992), KY REV STAT ANN § 214.181(5)(a) (Baldwin
1991); ME REV STAT ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A (West 1993), MD [HEALTH GEN] CODE
ANN § 18-336 (1993), MICH STAT ANN § 333.5133 (Callaghan 1993), MONT CODE
ANN § 50-16-1007 (1993), NC GEN STAT § 130A-148(h) (1992), OHIO REV CODE
ANN § 3701.292 (Anderson 1992), OKLA STAT ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.3 (West 1993), PA
CONS STAT ANN §7605(a) (1993), R I GEN LAWS § 23-6-12 (1993), TEX [HEALTH &
SAFTETY] CODE ANN § 81.105 (West 1993), W VA CODE § 16-3C-2 (1993).
86. See, ALA CODE § 22-1 IA-51 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ REV STAT ANN § 36-663
(Supp. 1993); CAL HEALTH & SAVETY CODE § 199.22(a) (West 1990); CONN GEN
STAT ANN § 19a-582 (West Supp. 1992); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202 (Supp. 1993);
FLA STAT ANN § 381.004(3) (West 1993); HAW REV STAT ANN § 325-16 (1991); ILL
ANN STAT ch. I 1.12, 7304 (Supp. 1992); IND CODE ANN § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (West 1992).
IOWA CODE ANN §§ 141.8-141.22 (West 1989); KY REV STAT ANN §§ 214.181(5) &
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While four states merely imply that testing must be volun-
tary a3 most statutes require some form of actual consent.
Three state statutes require that actual "consent" be given,"8
while seven jurisdictions require "informed consent" by the
person to be tested.8 9 Five of seventeen9" statutes require strin-
gent written and informed consent.9 As of 1994, only sixteen
jurisdictions had not yet enacted legislation "resolving" the
mandatory testing debate.92
Many of the jurisdictions promoting voluntary testing9"
and prohibiting HIV testing without consent, allow for limited
.625(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1991); LA REV. STAT ANN § 40:1300.13 (West
1992); ME REV STAT ANN tit. 5, § 19203-A (West 1964); MD. HEALTH-GEN CODE
ANN § 18-336(b) (1990 & Supp. 1993); MICH COMp LAWS ANN § 333.5133 (West
Supp. 1991); MINN STAT ANN § 144.765 (West Supp. 1993); MONT CODE ANN. § 50-
16-1007 (1991)as amended by 1993 Mont. Laws 476; NY PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781
(McKinney Supp. 1993); NC GEN STAT § 130A-148(h) (1992); OHIO REV CODE ANN.
§ 3701.242(A) (Anderson 1992); OKLA STAT ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.3 (Supp. 1993); OR.
REV STAT § 433.045 (1988); PA. CONS STAT ANN § 7605(a) (1993); RI GEN LAWS,
§§ 23-6-12, -13 (1956); TEX HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.105 (West 1992); WASH.
REV CODE ANN § 70.24.330 (West 1992); W VA. CODE § 16-3C-2 (1993); WIs STAT
ANN § 146.025 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992)
87. See ARK CODE ANN. § 20-15-905 (Michie 1991); COLO REV STAT ANN.
§ 25-4-1401 (1989 & Supp. 1993); GA CODE ANN- § 31-17A-2 to 31-17A-3 (Michie
Supp. 1993); Mo ANN. STAT § 191.674 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
88. IND CODE ANN § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (West 1992); OKLA STAT ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
502.3 (Supp. 1993); WASH REV CODE ANN § 70.24.330 (West 1992).
89. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22(a) (West 1990); FLA STAT ANN
§ 381.004(3) (West 1993); KY REV. STAT ANN §§ 214.181(5), 214.625(5) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1991); NC GEN STAT § 130A-148 (1992); OHIO REV CODE ANN
§ 3701.242 (E)(1), (E)(3), (E)(5)(Anderson 1992); OR REV STAT § 433.045 (1988);
TEX HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.105 (West Supp. 1992).
90. Sixteen if 42 U.S.C. is not included.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-61 (West Supp. 1994); ALA CODE § 22-1IA-51 (Supp.
1993); CONN GEN STAT ANN § 19a-582 (West Supp. 1992); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1202 (Supp. 1992); HAW REV STAT § 325-16 (1991); ILL ANN STAT ch. 111 , q
7304 (Supp. 1992); LA REV. STAT ANN § 40:1300.13 (West Supp. 1992); ME REV
STAT ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A (West 1964); MD CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN § 18-336(b)
(1990 & Supp. 1993); MICH Comp LAWS ANN § 333.5133 (West Supp. 1991); MONT
CODE ANN § 50-16-1007 (1991) as amended by 1993 Mont. Laws 476; NY PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1993); 35 PA CONS STAT ANN § 7605(a)
(Supp. 1991); RI GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6-12 to -13 (1956); WIs. STAT ANN § 146.025
(West Supp. 1992).
92. Alaska, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia.
93. See, e.g., 35 PA CONS STAT ANN. § 7602(c) (1993) (stating that "[i]t is the
intent of the General Assembly to promote confidential testing on an informed and volun-
tary basis in order to encourage those most in need to obtain testing and appropriate
counseling.").
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exceptions. These include exceptions for medical necessity,94 in
criminal justice settings,95 and for life insurance underwriting
purposes.9 Furthermore, as one commentator notes:
Mandatory screening is already a reality for all Defense De-
partment recruits, for all potential immigrants to the U.S.,
and for State Department foreign service personnel. The Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons and fourteen states have mandatory
screening programs for prison inmates, and the courts have
permitted prison officials wide discretion in controlling in-
mates who have AIDS. Courts are less accommodating to
mandatory testing in other contexts, such as the workplace. 97
In certain workplace settings, such as that of the professional
athlete, there can be some debate as to whether a mandatory
HIV testing policy is truly "involuntary" or whether consent
(possibly even informed and written consent) has been given.98
B. Analysis to be Applied to the Professional Athlete
Testing Proposal
In an effort to analyze the legalities and ethics of a pro-
posed mandatory HIV testing policy of a professional sports
club or league to be applied to its players, this note will use a
variation of the analytical criteria provided by Harvard Law
Professor Martha A. Field.99 As Lawrence 0. Gostin sug-
gested, "attempts to evaluate each proposal [for HIV screening
of a particular population] without a systematic theory of anal-
ysis could reach inconsistent results.' 00
Field provides several general principles for guiding the
analysis and evaluation of testing proposals:
First, the purpose of testing must be ethically acceptable....
Second, the proposed use of test results must contribute to
the program's goal.... Third, the test program must be the
least restrictive or intrusive means for attaining the pro-
94. See, e.g, OHIO REV CODE ANN § 3701.24.2(E)(3) & (6) (Anderson 1992); 35
PA CONS STAT. ANN § 7605(g)(1)(i) (1993).
95. See. e.g., LA REV STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(7) (West 1992) (requiring
HIV testing in rape and incest cases); W VA CODE § 16-3C-2(f) (Supp. 1993) (mandat-
ing HIV testing of persons convicted of sex offenses).
96. See AIDS & THE LAW Appendix U (William H.L. Dornette, ed., Supp. 1991)
(summarizing laws regarding HIV testing by insurers).
97. PRICE, supra note 82, at 446-47.
98. See infra part VI.B.
99. Field, supra note 5.
100. Gostin, supra note 82, at 21.
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gram's purpose. . . .Fourth, the benefit to public health
must warrant the extent of intrusion into personal liberties.10'
This note will employ these four principles to answer three
questions regarding the proposed policy involving mandatory
HIV testing of professional athletes.
The first principle remains largely unchanged. Does the
proposed testing policy serve an ethically acceptable purpose?
The second question attempts to blend Field's second and third
principles by asking if mandatory testing is necessary and ef-
fective for achieving that purpose. My third question for analy-
sis differs greatly from Field's fourth. Field evaluated proposed
screening policies proposed to be put into effect by government
entities (generally). Such government actions require a consti-
tutional analysis. Conversely, as the professional sports teams
and leagues are both a part of the private business sector, the
Constitution does not, generally speaking, provide the grounds
for complaints of individuals who may feel oppressed by their
employers. However, the individual rights of the professional
athlete, as developed in state, federal and common law, deserve
attention in the analysis of this issue. For this reason, the third
question asks if a mandatory testing policy in professional
sports violates the individual rights of the athlete?
Under this variation of the Field analysis, a conclusion
that mandatory HIV testing of professional athletes would be
both ethical and legal is warranted only if all three questions
received a well-reasoned affirmative answer.
IV. AN ETHICALLY ACCEPTABLE PURPOSE?
Ethics is the first issue that must be addressed when evalu-
ating a proposal for mandating HIV testing of all players on a
particular team or in a particular league. What is the true pur-
pose for the testing policy, and is it ethically acceptable? As
ethics are merely a "system or code of morals,"102 the question
101. Field, supra note 5, at 64-65. Other commentators provide similar lists of crite-
ria for assessing mandatory testing proposals. See GOSTIN, supra note 83, at 21-24. Gostin
lists five criteria for analysis: (1) a high reservoir of infection; (2) a significant risk of
transmission; (3) the effective use of test results; (4) the critical consequences of testing do
not outweigh the benefits; and (5) the existence of no less restrictive or intrusive means. Id.
at 21-24.
Id.
102. WEBSTER'S, supra note 1, at 481.
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arises as to what should constitute "ethically acceptable"? For
purposes of this analysis, this note will utilize the well-known
system of ethics known as utilitarianism. In order to be consid-
ered "ethically acceptable" under this doctrine, a proposal for
mandatory testing should be able "to bring about the greatest
happiness of the greatest number."' 03 Therefore, the utility of
mandatory testing must be determined as to the impact on the
athlete himself, the teammates, the opponents, the coaches and
other team management, the team trainers, the team physi-
cian(s), the owner(s) of the team, the player's family, the view-
ing audience and other fans and the general public.
Proponents of mandatory HIV testing in professional
sports are likely to claim that their policy will prevent, or help
to prevent, the transmission of the HIV virus, at least within
the sports community itself. Most would agree with Field's
statement that both "[p]rotecting public health and preventing
transmission of HIV are acceptable purposes ..... 104 Under
the utilitarian approach, preventing HIV transmission, even if
only within the sports community, would bring great benefit to
an enormous number of persons; therefore, this general purpose
easily could be argued to be ethically acceptable for purposes
of this analysis.
Protection of the HIV-infected player is the second pur-
pose which proponents would suggest is served by mandatory
testing. This arguably could mean that the team which tests all
players hopes to protect its investment in any player testing
positive by providing the necessary medical treatment and
drugs, such as AZT,'0 5 to prolong the player's career. Although
not necessarily a purely humanitarian gesture, the protection of
a business investment or an "asset"'' 0 6 clearly would be consid-
ered ethically acceptable under some systems of ethics, such as
Materialism. 0 7 From the utilitarian view, it may be argued
that this purpose is ethically acceptable as it provides the
greatest happiness to the greatest number. For example, the
player who has worked for many years in an attempt to achieve
103. Id. at 1565.
104. Field, supra note 5, at 64.
105. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
106. See supra part I.A.
107. WEBSTER'S, supra note 1, at 875 (defining materialism as "the doctrine that
comfort, pleasure, and wealth are the only or highest goals or values").
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his dream of being a professional athlete may continue to live
this dream; team management and owner(s), teammates, the
viewing audience and fans of the team may continue to receive
the benefits inherent in this player's continued efforts as a part
of a team; and the family of the player continues to receive the
benefits inherent in the player's theoretically longer career and
life. It should be noted that, although this purpose is on its face
ethically acceptable, it may lead to discriminatory practices if
the team's management takes an overly paternalistic approach
to protecting players, such as limiting a player's actual involve-
ment in the game "for his own good."
Another purpose which some proponents may argue that
mandatory HIV testing achieves is the protection of other play-
ers, coaches and trainers when management knows to use cer-
tain precautions when dealing with an HIV-positive player. Al-
though this appears to be ethically acceptable, this purpose is
somewhat suspect. In team sports, especially those with a level
of contact which might make them "bloody" sports, 108 univer-
sal precautions should be taken regardless of whether anyone is
HIV-positive on the team. 0 9 Safeguarding those who take care
of a player, perhaps after an injury, raises issues similar to the
HIV testing debate in the health care setting. The conclusion
reached by Professor Gostin regarding screening health care
patients and staff is equally pertinent to the sports setting. He
states:
The relatively low level of risk in the health care setting does
not justify a wide scale screening program. Even if a screen-
ing program is implemented, its utility may be questionable.
The health care worker should use the strictest precautions to
avoid contracting HIV from the body fluids . . . [.] These
precautions include using rubber gloves if the worker has a
cut or open sore, and avoiding parenteral exposure. Health
care workers should always be cautious in handling blood,
body fluids, and items soiled with these substances.11 °
108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
109. Universal precautions should be taken at all times when blood is involved in
sport, whether or not anyone is known to be HIV-positive on the team. Mandatory testing
of one team would not eliminate the chances of other teams' players being HIV-positive;
mandatory testing of the entire league would raise disclosure and confidentiality problems.
Furthermore, the existence of the latency period clearly illustrates the reason why universal
precautions should be used at all times and in relation to all players, not just those testing
positive. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
110. Gostin, supra note 83, at 37-38 (emphasis added).
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The final purpose to be discussed involves the determina-
tion of fitness for the sport. Contractually, the player has repre-
sented that his "general overall state of physical well-being is
such that he can endure the rigors of professional sports train-
ing and competition,""' so monitoring all aspects of the
player's health which may affect his ability to perform under
the contract is clearly an ethically acceptable purpose on its
face. Arguments supporting this conclusion under Utilitarian-
ism would be quite similar to those discussed earlier supporting
the acceptance of the purpose of protecting an HIV-infected
athlete. Although this purpose may appear ethically acceptable,
this fitness requirement in the standard player contract could
easily be used as a front for discriminatory practices.11 2
Although some of these purposes arguably may be a mere
front for discrimination against HIV-positive athletes, which is
clearly ethically unacceptable, proponents of mandatory testing
in professional sports argue that these purposes are acceptable,
even under utilitarian principles. Assuming that these individu-
als are correct and that an ethically acceptable purpose is
served by mandatory HIV testing, one must next determine if
mandatory testing is necessary and effective for achieving that
purpose.
V. NECESSARY AND EFFECTIVE FOR ACHIEVING
A PURPOSE?
The determination of whether mandatory HIV testing of
all professional athletes, in a particular league or on a certain
team, is necessary and effective for achieving a purpose de-
pends upon the given purpose for the testing policy. For exam-
ple, as has already been discussed, the safeguarding of players
and staff by knowing to use certain precautions does not neces-
sitate mandatory testing. In fact, mandatory testing would not
be effective in safeguarding others, because HIV-infected play-
ers could test negative during the latency period and still be
able to transmit the virus to others." 3 Furthermore, as Field
states, "the false sense of security and reduced precautions that
111. WEISTART, supra note 23, at 216-17.
112. See infra part VI. A., D.
113. Field, supra note 5, at 41.
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testing can breed pose a serious difficulty with a testing
program."1"4
On the other hand, two other purposes are effectively
achieved by mandatory testing. If a team wishes to determine
the fitness of a player or desires to protect the team's invest-
ment in each athlete (by supplying the appropriate medical
care and AZT to those testing positive), HIV testing of all ath-
letes is necessary. In each case, the team's owners are, to some
extent, protecting their investment. Therefore, anything less
than mandatory testing would be ineffective for these purposes.
Although the broadly stated purpose of preventing trans-
mission of the HIV virus is the most likely to go uncontested as
ethically acceptable, its vagueness leaves much room for debate
as to whether mandatory testing is necessary, or even effective,
for preventing transmission. The first question that arises is
whether the transmission sought to be prevented is potential
transmission during the game. Or, is the purpose to also pre-
vent transmission on or off the playing field, perhaps by encour-
aging behavior modification? If the goal is to answer the latter,
it would be difficult to prove that mandatory testing is neces-
sary, or even effective. Although mandatory testing arguably
would allow a larger number (theoretically one-hundred per-
cent) to know their HIV status than a voluntary testing propo-
sal would, a number of variations for voluntary testing and ed-
ucation programs could be proposed which could be as
effective, or more effective, in modifying behavior to prevent
transmission. With such equally effective options available,
mandatory testing would not seem to be necessary to achieve
the purposes defined above.
Should one define the purpose of mandatory testing as the
prevention of transmission only on the playing field, the analy-
sis becomes a little more complex. First, the issue of the risk of
transmission during play must be touched upon. Some argue
that there is no true risk,1 5 and therefore no need for
mandatory testing. Those in the sports community who advo-
cate mandatory testing of professional athletes often base their
fears of transmission on very small theoretical possibilities,' 6
114. Id. at 60.
115. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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coupled with generalizations of athletes' opportunities for un-
safe promiscuous sexual behavior."1 Professor Gostin states
that the mere possibility of a group being at "high" risk is
inadequate:
To establish the effectiveness of a screening program, it is
necessary to demonstrate not only a high reservoir of infec-
tion, but also a high risk of transmission. Effective screening
programs require a setting where transmission of infection is
reasonably likely to occur. Screening decisions should be
grounded upon the best scientific and epidemiologic evidence
relating to transmission of the infection. . . .[Furthermorej
[i]f all persons within a selected population are to be
screened, the resulting information must be used effectively
to reduce the spread of infection. If the precautions that
might be taken cannot reduce transmission, there is no pur-
pose to a screening program. 118
Therefore, it could be argued that mandatory testing is ineffec-
tive for reducing the spread of the virus through transmission
on the playing field, as experts currently think that that risk is
"extremely unlikely." 1 9 Mandating HIV testing for athletes is
an extreme solution to what is currently considered by experts
a practically nonexistent problem. Therefore, the necessity of a
mandatory testing policy is called into question.
For the sake of the ensuing legal argument, this note will
assume that a mandatory testing program whereby a team rou-
tinely tests each of its players pursuant to team rules (incorpo-
rated into the standard player contract) is both necessary and
effective for preventing the transmission of the HIV virus on
the playing field. The issue then becomes whether such a policy
effectively could prevent the risk of transmission without violat-
ing the players' individual rights.
VI. NON-VIOLATIVE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS?
Individual rights of the athletes which clearly must be pro-
tected are established by state statutes, federal legislation and
the common law. The four legal issues which will be discussed
in this section are: the common law right to privacy, the state
statutory issues of consent and confidentiality and the freedom
117. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
118. Gostin, supra note 83, at 23 (emphasis added).
119. See supra notes 68 and 70 and accompanying text.
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from employment discrimination, as illustrated by the feder-
ally-enacted Americans with Disabilities Act. 20
A. The Common Law Privacy Issue
The broadest of an individual athlete's individual rights
likely to be affected by a mandatory HIV testing policy is his
right of privacy. This right of privacy generally has been de-
fined as:
The right to be let alone; the right of a person to be free from
unwarranted publicity. . . . The right of an individual . . . to
withhold himself and his property from public scrutiny, if he
so chooses. 21
As Professor Gostin states, "[s]creening necessarily entails
a restriction on individuals' rights to privacy; it involves blood
sampling and the collection of sensitive information."' 22 Propo-
nents of mandatory testing of professional athletes may argue
that an athlete's acceptance of the standard player contract
and its corresponding rules negates any invasion of privacy.
The physical nature of sport, as has been discussed earlier, re-
quires certain medical examinations and blood tests to deter-
mine, for example, whether a player is physically fit to play as
required by his contract and whether a player is abusing drugs
as is prohibited by team and league rules. 123 Therefore, it may
be argued that a player's individual right to privacy is aban-
doned when he signs a contract, and thereby agrees to abide by
team policies. Furthermore, the athlete's privacy interest is, ar-
guably, no more violated by the HIV testing than by any other
routine medical tests required by team and league policies. In
fact, if the purpose of the testing policy is to determine a
player's fitness to play, a player arguably has obligated himself
to prove his fitness under the contract by subjecting himself to
such testing, if necessary.
120. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (1993).
121. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (6th ed. 1990).
122. Gostin, supra note 83, at 21.
123. See generally Stephen F. Brock & Kevin M. McKenna, Drug Testing in
Sports. 92 DICK L REV 505 (1988) (discussing drug testing measures enacted by various
athletic organizations); J. Otis Cochran, Drug Testing of Athletes and the United States
Constitution: Crisis and Conflict, 92 DICK L REv. 571 (1988); Glenn M. Wong & Rich-
ard J. Ensor, Major League Baseball and Drugs: Fight the Problem or the Player?, I I
NOVA L REV 779 (1987) (discussing history and status of legalities of drug use and test-
ing issues).
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On the other hand, an HIV test is unlike any other blood
test. In the modern world, persons who are HIV-positive are
oftentimes discriminated against. "Fear, bigotry and lack of
understanding are largely responsible for the consequences that
can flow from a positive test result. The response is due in large
part to other parties' fear that the infection will be transmit-
ted."' 24 Furthermore, the information collected should be con-
sidered more sensitive than that acquired through other medi-
cal and physical examinations, due to the fact that the virus is
generally spread through some sort of "risky behavior" which
oftentimes illustrates a person's most private lifestyle choices.
Although it may be conceded that an athlete agreed to abide
by the rules and policies of the team and league when he signed
his lucrative contract, we, as a society, must begin to think
about how far this should be allowed to go. To what extent
may a professional athlete bargain away his individual rights?
In summary, it is clear that the individual athlete's right
of privacy is intruded upon by a team or league which man-
dates HIV testing. But the issue remains whether or not that
intrusion should be permitted, as it appears that such invasions
of privacy are commonly (and often expressly) accepted by the
athlete himself as part and parcel of the "big league" contract.
B. The State Statutory Issue of Consent
As discussed in Part liA of this note, the majority of
states have enacted legislation requiring some form of consent
for an individual to be tested for HIV antibodies. 125 These stat-
utes require varying levels of consent, ranging from actual
"consent" to "informed consent" to "written and informed con-
sent."' 26 It appears that such statutes are meant to prevent the
very type of policy at issue in this note - the mandatory HIV
testing of a class of persons such as employees. It, therefore,
appears that in some states the mandatory testing of profes-
sional athletes by their respective teams and/or leagues would
constitute a prima facie violation of state law.
However, this is not necessarily true. When a professional
athlete signs the standard player contract, he agrees to abide
124. Field, supra note 5, at 45.
125. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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by the league and team rules and policies, which conceivably
would include any mandatory HIV testing policy.'27 Although
the NLRA requires the employer team to bargain with players
collectively about terms and conditions of employment, 12 8 once
a collective bargaining agreement is reached, it is binding on
all players signing the standard player contract, whether or not
they specifically agree with the bargain reached.'2 9 Therefore,
it is theoretically possible for an individual athlete to sign a
standard player contract, which could be seen as providing con-
sent for HIV testing, without individually agreeing with the is-
sue of "mandatory" HIV testing.
This leads directly to the issue of whether or not such a
testing policy is actually "mandatory." Proponents of such test-
ing argue that it is not truly mandatory as consent is implied
when the player accepts his contract. Arguably, the player may
choose not to be tested as a condition of his employment by
refusing to sign a contract with such a team or in such a
league. On the other hand, one must remember the years of
hard work leading to a professional sports contract, the hand-
some monetary rewards which often accompany such a con-
tract and the not uncommon factors of youth, inexperience and
lack of other realistic opportunities. Even when a young, inex-
perienced athlete is adequately represented by an agent, 30 it
appears to be fair to say that the athlete will choose to fulfill
his dream and continue to play his sport. This may mean that
he is required to consent to rules which are not generally ap-
plied to the general public, such as curfews, medical exams,
routine drug testing and, arguably, routine HIV testing.
The idea that consent is provided upon acceptance of the
standard player contract incorporating the rules of the team
and league, might logically pass muster in a jurisdiction requir-
ing simple "consent" to testing. This argument becomes more
obtuse when dealing with those jurisdictions requiring "in-
formed" or "written and informed" consent to testing. In such
127. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
128. See discussion supra Part I.B.
129. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
130. It should be noted that many sports agents are not sports attorneys and are not
trained in the law. For this reason, "adequately represented" in this context refers to repre-
sentation by an agent who is sufficiently aware of the player's individual rights regarding
testing and who properly advises the athlete on those rights.
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jurisdictions the team or league conceivably would need to re-
quire under its contract that the player sign a separate consent
form after being informed of the testing procedures and poten-
tial impact of the results. Would this be sufficient to meet the
requirements set forth by a state statute requiring written and
informed consent, such as that of Pennsylvania? That statute
states: "no HIV-related test shall be performed without first
obtaining the informed written consent of the subject. Any con-
sent shall be preceded by an explanation of the test, including
its purpose, potential uses, limitations and the meaning of its
results." This question will likely be left to the courts.
When answering the question whether teams or leagues
can require a player to provide informed consent for testing,
the purposes behind the legal doctrine of informed consent
should serve as a guide. One commentator has stated:
Informed consent reflects one of our highest social values, in-
dividual autonomy. It reflects a strong emotional need for a
sense of control over our own lives and an admission of our
dependence upon others, and it deals with a subject of funda-
mental importance, our health. . . . Informed consent is com-
prised of two legal duties imposed on physicians: to inform
patients about treatment, and to obtain their consent to treat-
ment. These duties are imposed in order to assure that a per-
son's right of self-determination may be maintained in one
particular sphere of human activity, the acquisition of medi-
cal care. In addition to safeguarding the right to determine
one's own destiny, the informed consent doctrine encourages,
but does not require, patients to make informed or intelligent
decisions about medical care. Viewed broadly, the duties of
making disclosures and of obtaining consent are supposed to
allow the patient to play the role of primary medical decision
maker.13'
Although proponents of testing are likely to argue that a player
gives up, to a certain extent, his right to individual autonomy
when it comes to his health and fitness, when he signs the con-
tract, arguably true informed consent may not be given under
penalty of losing a "big league" contract.
In conclusion, it appears possible for a team or league to
finesse a mandatory HIV testing policy so as not to violate
131. 35 PA CONS STAT ANN § 7605(a) (1993).
132. CHARLES W LIDZ ET AL, INFORMED CONSENT A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
IN PSYCHIATRY 10 (1984).
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state consent statutes. This is theoretically true even in those
states requiring the strictest form of consent, which is both in-
formed and written. Although such a testing policy appears to
be a creative possibility for a sports team or league counsel,
such a policy defeats the purposes of the legal doctrine of in-
formed consent. Once again, to what extent may a professional
athlete bargain away his individual rights to play his sport and
to earn a living?
C. The State Statutory Issue of Confidentiality
When evaluating any HIV testing policy, it is essential to
determine how the results of such tests will be used. Simply
put, a mandatory HIV testing policy cannot be created in a
vacuum, and "[t]he value of testing as a strategy to combat
AIDS depends completely on how the information from tests
will be used." 133 One key issue which many state legislatures
have examined is that of the confidentiality of the test results.
A proposed mandatory testing policy affecting all profes-
sional athletes on a particular team or in a certain league must
be artfully devised so as not to violate any state confidentiality
statute. This appears to be very difficult in sports. In order to
fulfill the theoretical purposes discussed in Part IV, a wide va-
riety of individuals, such as coaches, trainers, team physicians
and team owners, as well as possibly the teammates and oppo-
nents, are likely to have access to HIV results. This is analo-
gous to the situation seen in the military, which has put into
effect a mandatory testing policy:
Even when a screening program purports to ensure it, confi-
dentiality may be difficult to maintain. For example, in the
military, the guarantee of confidentiality is ineffective in
practice. "Confidential" test information can be released to
the commander of the infected soldier, medical personnel,
spouses, local authorities and others on a "need to know" ba-
sis. Moreover, the consequences typically associated with
testing HIV-positive in the military, such as reassignment or
restricted duties, can act as a signal to others of a soldier's
infected status. The military example illustrates that when
rules designed to maintain confidentiality are not tightly
drawn and narrowly tailored, they become meaningless. 13
133. Field, supra note 5, at 37.
134. Id. at 49-50 (emphasis added).
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In order to evaluate effectively a mandatory testing proposal
for professional sports, one must look beyond the face of the
policy to determine if it will in practice preserve the confidenti-
ality of the individual athletes tested. Clearly, in the sports bus-
iness, there is much room for violation of particular state confi-
dentiality statutes.
D. The Federal Freedom from Employment Discrimination
Issue
Once again the proposal for mandatory testing of athletes
must be examined in the context of the intended uses of the
results. Clearly, positive HIV antibody test results may be used
in various ways. The only ethically acceptable uses are those
which are in line with the ethically acceptable purposes for
mandatory testing discussed in Part IV. The use of such results
to discriminate against members of a team or league, or poten-
tial members (by terminating a player's contract solely on
grounds of his HIV status, by failing to offer an HIV-positive
player a new contract, or by reducing or eliminating an ath-
lete's playing time) is not only unethical, but also illegal. Such
discrimination against an HIV-infected athlete is illegal under
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 35
The ADA states that an employer shall not "discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment."'' 6 The legislative history of the
ADA and its corresponding regulations explains that HIV in-
fection and AIDS are to be considered "disabilities" under the
Act.13 7
In the realm of professional sports the issue of discrimina-
tion is especially noteworthy. As was stated previously, profes-
sional sports teams have very broad discretion to terminate or
suspend a player. 13 8 One acceptable cause for such termination
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1993). See also Thomas v. Atascadero Unified
School District Bd., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); District 27, Community School v.
Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1993).
137. CLOSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 31.
138. See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
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is that the athlete is not physically fit for the rigors of the
sport. Clearly, a team may finesse its way into terminating the
contract of an HIV-positive player through this cause. How-
ever, if discriminatory practices ensue from a mandatory test-
ing program, the ADA arguably would protect the individual
athlete's right to be free from such discrimination in
employment.
The problem, though, occurs in the fact that athletic em-
ployment is very different from other types of employment due
to its physical nature. 139 It can be argued that the mandatory
testing of professional athletes may slip through a loophole in
the ADA. One commentator has noted that:
To be protected from discrimination, the person with disabili-
ties must be able to perform essential job functions to a rea-
sonable standard. . . . [E]mployers may not use pre-employ-
ment medical examinations except to determine whether an
employee can 'perform job-related functions.' Similarly, cur-
rent employees cannot be required to undergo medical exami-
nations except for job-related reasons. One standard specifi-
cally included in the law in response to fears of contagion is
that employers 'may include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace.'140
This brings the analysis back to the issue of whether there is
truly a risk of transmission from blood-to-blood contact during
contact on the playing field. Those who argue that there is, and
who advocate mandatory testing, are likely to contend that
there is a direct threat to the health and safety of other players
and training staff. They may argue that a termination of such a
player's contract or even a modification of his usual playing
status is therefore allowable under the ADA. Furthermore,
they may question whether an HIV-infected athlete is able to
perform job-related functions, due to the effects of the virus on
the player's immune system. 4'
Although discrimination against employees with the virus
is clearly prohibited, in general, by the ADA, a mandatory
139. See supra part I.B.
140. CLOSEN ET AL, supra note 5, at 32.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (4) (A) ("a covered entity shall not require a medical
examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is
an individual with a disability . . . unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job
related and consistent with business necessity.").
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testing policy for professional athletes is not necessarily viola-
tive of the ADA merely because of the potential for discrimina-
tory practices resulting from the test results. The statute ex-
pressly gives employers the right to conduct pre-employment
medical examinations to determine whether the employee can
perform job-related duties."" An employer also can require
current employees to undergo medical exams for job-related
reasons. Clearly, in the professional sports context, both of
these types of medical examinations are completed to ensure
the continued physical fitness of the players. The ADA seems
to imply that such examinations may include HIV testing, so
long as it is conducted for job-related reasons. Further, the
ADA appears to imply that an employer may test for HIV an-
tibodies so as not to allow an employee to pose a direct threat
to the health or safety of others in the workplace.
Although mandatory testing of professional athletes for
HIV antibodies appears to be legal under the ADA, if narrowly
tailored to fit this loophole, the fact remains that such testing is
likely to result in discriminatory practices due to the great dis-
cretion of team management to terminate employment. The ex-
istence of such a loophole in the ADA may allow a team to
lawfully discriminate against HIV-positive athletes, but such
discrimination arising out of mandatory testing may be consid-
ered in many ethical systems, including Utilitarianism, to be
unethical.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (2) prohibits pre-employment medical examinations ex-
cept as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (3) which states that a medical examination
may be required:
[A]fter an offer of employment has been made . . . and prior to the commence-
ment of the employment . . ., and [the employer] may condition an offer of em-
ployment on the results . . . if-
(A) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination . . .
(B) information obtained regarding the medical condition . . . is collected and
maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as
confidential medical record, except that-
(i) supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restric-
tions on the work . . . of the employee and necessary accommodations;
(ii) first aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate. .
It should also be noted that an employer "may make pre-employment inquiries into the
ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (2) (B).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The conclusion that a mandatory HIV testing policy for
professional athletes by their team or league would be both eth-
ical and legal, is warranted only if the following three criteria
are met. The first is the finding of an ethically acceptable pur-
pose. Clearly, various purposes could be found which, at least
facially, are ethically acceptable. The second question, whether
mandatory testing is both necessary and effective for achieving
the purpose, is more difficult to answer. Should it be decided
that the only truly ethically acceptable purpose of mandatory
testing is to prevent the transmission of the virus on the playing
field, then it must be concluded that mandatory testing is
neither necessary nor effective, due to what experts know about
the low risk of transmission from blood-to-blood contact. Fi-
nally, it is difficult to conclude that mandatory HIV testing of
professional athletes is truly non-violative of the players' indi-
vidual rights under state, federal and common law. Although a
little finesse in drafting the policy may circumvent some of the
legal problems with such a testing proposal, such a policy is not
truly non-violative of individual rights when players are forced
to bargain away such rights in order to play their sport and
earn a living. The sports arena naturally holds great potential
for violating the athletes' individual rights of confidentiality
and freedom from discrimination; therefore, one must deter-
mine what will be done with the results of a positive HIV test
under such a policy, both in theory and in practice. Without a
clearly affirmative finding of each of the three criteria dis-
cussed, this analysis concludes that a mandatory HIV testing
proposal for professional athletes within a certain league or on
a particular team, is neither legal nor ethical in today's society.
Since the original disclosure by Magic Johnson, many per-
sons involved in the world of professional sports have called for
mandatory HIV testing as the answer to the AIDS problem in
sports. A common retort has been that there is no problem, as
the risk of transmission of HIV through sports contact is infini-
tesimally small. Yet, the mere existence of such fear among the
athletes, team management and owners, illustrates that there is
a problem. The solution to this dilemma is not clear. This note
posed the question "is mandatory HIV testing of professional
athletes really the solution?" The answer is no.
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EPILOGUE
Since the original writing of this note, a news story devel-
oped which once again illustrates the serious and grave nature
of mandating HIV testing of professional athletes.
On April 16, 1993, thirty-year-old Ruben Palacio was
stripped of his World Boxing Organization ("WBO") feather-
weight world championship title by the WBO Championship
Committee, after testing positive for HIV during a mandatory
pre-fight antibody test. 43 "It took journeyman boxer Ruben
Palacio 12 years to win a world title. On the eve of his first
defense, he became the first champion to test positive for the
AIDS virus."' 44 WBO Championship Committee President, Ed
Levine, stated that barring the HIV-positive boxer from the
ring was the only option:
We can't risk the life of another boxer by letting him fight.
• ..It's a kind of disease that can be spread via blood con-
tact, and boxing is a sport where that is likely to happen. 4 5
The news story then quoted Levine on the fate of the Co-
lombian boxer,
It's a personal tragedy that goes far beyond the sport.
You think of Magic Johnson at the height of his basketball
career. It comes into perspective and you see it's a major
problem in the world. Instead of going home with the biggest
payday of his career, he's going home with a test result that
indicates his life is substantially shortened. 4 6
Perhaps this is the most important thing to keep in mind.
Jennifer L. Johnstont
143. Palacio Tests Positive for HIV, Stripped of WBO Title, ERIE DAILY TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1993, at 3-C. (stating that HIV testing has been routinely required as part of the
pre-fight medical examination in Great Britain for several years).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1994).
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APPENDIX A
MANDATORY HIV TESTING AND PROFESSIONAL
HOCKEY
QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer the following questions as fully as possible, to
the best of your knowledge. Feel free to explain any answers or
to make any additional comments in the margins or on the
back of the page. Your time and cooperation in this
matter is greatly appreciated.
1. Does your team have an HIV/AIDS testing policy?
YES - NO
[If you answered NO to question number 1, please move on to question
#12.]
2. Does this policy mandate HIV/AIDS testing, or does the policy merely
allow for voluntary HIV/AIDS testing?
MANDATORY TEST- VOLUNTARY TEST
3. To whom does this policy apply? [check all that apply]
PLAYERS - COACHES __
TRAINERS__ OTHER:_
4. How often is testing required/offered? [per season]
ONCE __ TWICE - THREE TIMES
MORE THAN THREE TIMES -
5. At what point are such tests required/offered? [check all that apply]
PRESEASON/CAMP PHYSICAL - TRYOUT PHYSICAL
DURING SEASON
if "during season", please specify:
6. Based upon the HIV/AIDS testing policy guidelines, who receives (or
knows of) the results of the tests? [check all that apply]
PLAYER TESTED - COACHES __
GENERAL MANAGER - TEAM PHYSICIAN(s)
INSURER TRAINERS
ECHL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
OTHER PLAYERS ON SAME TEAM -
GAME OFFICIALS - OTHER ECHL PLAYERS
AGENT OF PLAYER TESTED -
FAMILY OF PLAYER TESTED
OTHER:
7. In actuality, who do you believe learns of the results of these tests?
[check all that apply] PLAYER TESTED - COACHES
GENERAL MANAGER-_ TEAM PHYSICIAN(s)
INSURER - TRAINERS __
ECHL ADMIN. OFFICIALS
GAME OFFICIALS
OTHER PLAYERS ON SAME TEAM
OTHER ECHL PLAYERS-
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AGENT OF PLAYER TESTED
FAMILY OF PLAYER TESTED.
THE PUBLIC
OTHER:
8. Do you believe your answer to question number 7 would be different if
the test results referred to showed one of your players to be HIV-
positive?
YES __ NO __ DON'T KNOW
If "yes", how would your answer differ?
9. If your team's policy is to provide HIV/AIDS testing on a voluntary
basis, who would be aware of a player's consent to be tested? [check all
that apply] PLAYER TO BE TESTED - COACHES -
GENERAL MANAGER TEAM PHYSICIAN(s) -
INSURER - TRAINERS - ECHL ADMIN. OFFICIALS-
GAME OFFICIALS - OTHER PLAYERS ON SAME TEAM
OTHER ECHL PLAYERS __ AGENT OF PLAYER TO BE
TESTED - FAMILY OF PLAYER TO BE TESTED -
OTHER: N/A
10. Under your team's HIV/AIDS testing policy, who performs the
testing?
TEAM PHYSICIAN - INDEPENDENT PHYSICIAN
PLAYER's CHOICE_
[note: by "team physician" this study is referring to a physician on the
payroll of the team]
11. Are players assigned to your team by American Hockey League affili-
ates required to abide by the HIV/AIDS testing policy of your team?
YES - NO - N/A because none assigned -
12. Does your team's insurer require HIV/AIDS testing?
YES - NO
If "yes", who performs the testing?
13. Does your team provide any AIDS education for your players? [for
example, information on the medical risks of transmission during play,
through sexual contact, through IV drug use, etc.] YES - NO -
If "yes", please explain to what extent education is provided (for exam-
ple, bringing in team physician to talk, providing condoms, etc.]:
14. If you were to poll your players on the question of whether or not there
should be mandatory HIV/AIDS testing in professional hockey, what
would the results be?
ALMOST ALL FOR MANDATORY TESTING
MORE FOR THAN AGAINST -
MORE AGAINST THAN FOR -
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(ALMOST ALL AGAINST) MANDATORY TESTING
APPROXIMATELY EQUAL - DON'T KNOW
[Is this your estimate or the results of an actual poll?]
ESTIMATE POLL-
15. In your opinion, regardless of actual team policies, do you believe that
mandatory testing for HIV/AIDS is necessary in professional hockey?
YES - NO - DON'T KNOW -
16. In your opinion as a coach, do you believe a professional hockey player
is at a greater risk of contracting HIV/AIDS during play than a pro-
fessional basketball player? YES - NO - DON'T KNOW -
17. In your opinion as a coach, do you believe a professional hockey player
is at a greater risk of contracting HIV/AIDS during play than a pro-
fessional football player? YES - NO - DON'T KNOW -
18. In your opinion as a coach, do you believe a professional hockey player
is at a greater risk of contracting HIV/AIDS during play than a pro-
fessional baseball player? YES - NO - DON'T KNOW -
19. In your opinion, regardless of any actual team policies or league poli-
cies, could a professional hockey player who is HIV-positive continue to
play hockey in this league without jeopardizing the health and safety of
other players and staff?
YES - NO - DON'T KNOW
20. If you were asked question number 15 and question number 19 again,
but this time you were asked your opinion from the perspective of being
a former professional hockey player yourself, would your answers be
any different?
[please try to forget for the moment your capacity as a coach]
Question 15: SAME - DIFFERENT -, explain:
Question 19: SAME - DIFFERENT -, explain:
21. How many seasons have you coached hockey in this league?
This league - Other leagues?
22. How many seasons have you played as a professional?
In which leagues?
23. Please provide any comments you would like to add on the subject of
HIV/AIDS testing and professional hockey:
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your answers
will provide great insight into this topic. Please return this questionnaire in
the envelope enclosed for your convenience. Thank you once again.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix B compiles the results of a "Mandatory HIV
Testing and Professional Hockey Questionnaire" which was
mailed to fifteen head coaches of minor league professional
hockey teams in the East Coast Hockey League ("ECHL").
The teams are located throughout the east coast region.
Coaches of the following teams received questionnaires:
Birmingham (Ala.) Bulls Knoxville (Tenn.) Cherokees
Columbus (Ohio) Chill Louisville (Ky.) IceHawks
Dayton (Ohio) Bombers Nashville (Tenn.) Knights
Erie (Penn.) Panthers Raleigh (N.C. ) IceCaps
Greensboro (N.C.) Monarchs Richmond (Va.) Renegades
Hampton Roads (Va.) Admirals Roanoke Valley (Va.) Rampage
Johnstown (Penn.) Chiefs Toledo (Ohio) Storm
Wheeling (W.Va.) Thunderbirds
This questionnaire (found at Appendix A) was sent to coaches
in mid-February 1993. The results, which are reported below,
were compiled in the early part of April 1993.
RESPONSE:
Of the fifteen ECHL coaches approached, nine graciously
responded. These coaches represent a long history of hockey
coaching and playing experience:
*They represent a combined total of twenty-nine years of expe-
rience coaching in the ECHL.
*They represent a combined total of thirty-three years of expe-
rience coaching in other leagues.
*They represent a combined total of eighty-two years of experi-
ence playing professional hockey in the following leagues:
National Hockey 77.7 % (of the nine
League responding)
American Hockey 77.7%
League
International Hockey 77.7 %
League
Canadian Hockey 44.44%
League
World Hockey 33.33%
Association
East Coast Hockey 11.11 %
League
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North Eastern Hockey 11.11%
League
Atlantic Coast Hockey 11.11%
League
Hockey League 11.11%
in European play
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE:
Unless noted otherwise, each of the following statistics
represents the percentage of the total responding (nine) who
responded to the question with that particular answer. A few
noted questions received responses from less than the total
number of coaches responding. Furthermore, those issues raised
by the questionnaire which were left unanswered by one hun-
dred percent of the responding coaches (due to the lack of any
HIV/AIDS testing policy) will not be listed below, for pur-
poses of spatial economy.
*Does your team have an HIV/AIDS testing policy?
NO 100%
YES 0 %
*Does your team's insurer require HIV/AIDS testing?
[Please note: only eight of the nine coaches responded to
this particular question.]
NO 100%
YES 0 %
*Does your team provide any AIDS education for your
players?
NO 66.67 %
YES 33.33%
*Of those who answered YES to providing some sort of AIDS
education for their players, the following percentages pro-
vided the following types of education:
Talk by team physician 66.67 %
Trainer's HIV/AIDS Awareness Prgm. 33.33 %
Condoms made available 33.33%
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*If you were to poll your players on the question of whether or
not there should be mandatory HIV/AIDS testing in pro-
fessional hockey, the results would be:
MORE FOR THAN AGAINST 33.33%
MORE AGAINST THAN FOR 33.33 %
ALMOST ALL AGAINST MAND. TESTING 22.22%
APPROXIMATELY EQUAL 0%
DON'T KNOW 0%
*When asked if the preceding answer was the coach's estimate
or the result of an actual poll, the five coaches who answered,
stated that it was their estimate. Not one coach actually polled
his team.
*In your opinion, regardless of actual team policies, do you be-
lieve that mandatory testing for HIV/AIDS is necessary in
professional hockey?
YES 66.67 %
NO 22.22%
DON'T KNOW 11.11%
*When asked if the preceding answer would change if asked
his opinion from the perspective of being a former professional
hockey player himself, the coaches responded:
WOULD BE THE SAME 88.89%
WOULD BE DIFFERENT 11.11%
*In your opinion as a coach, do you believe a professional
hockey player is at a greater risk of contracting HIV/AIDS
during play than a professional basketball player?
YES 44.44 %
NO 33.33 %
DON'T KNOW 22.22%
*In your opinion as a coach, do you believe a professional
hockey player is at a greater risk of contracting HIV/
AIDS during play than a professional football player?
YES 44.44 %
NO 33.33 %
DON'T KNOW 22.22%
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*In your opinion as a coach, do you believe a professional
hockey player is at a greater risk of contracting HIV/AIDS
during play than a professional baseball player?
YES 55.50%
NO 33.33 %
DON'T KNOW 11.11%
*In your opinion, regardless of any actual team policies or
league policies, could a professional hockey player who is HIV-
positive continue to play in this league without jeopardizing the
health and safety of other players and staff?
NO 44.44%
DON'T KNOW 33.33 %
YES 22.22%
*When asked if the preceding answer would change if asked
his opinion from the perspective of being a former professional
hockey player himself, the coaches responded:
WOULD BE THE SAME 77.78 %
WOULD BE DIFFERENT 22.22%
Finally, many of the coaches responding to this questionnaire
took the time to provide additional comments on the subject
of HIV/AIDS testing and professional hockey. The follow-
ing comments were found to be extremely helpful for pur-
poses of this study:
--"It is a very serious matter that I believe is not given
nearly enough concern. Management I believe are shun-
ning a very dangerous matter at hand. I include myself on
the shame list."
-"They need a hardened approach to scare these kids about
how serious HIV/AIDS are. Better education about off ice
conduct."
-"As a coach & player I would like to see mandatory test-
ing to be sure who has AIDS and who does not. Because of
the number of cuts that happen in hockey it could be dan-
gerous to other people how [we] are taking care of that
player."
-"All players should take a complete medical at the start of
the season. Which means HIV/AIDS testing would be
completed and results given to management (coach/man-
agers) and these results would be private and dealt [with]
by the player and management together for the safety of
the player and his teammates and opponents."
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